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Summary. Russell‘s main academic project was to make mathematics rigorous, reducing it to 
logic. Before August-1900, Russell‘s logic was based on mereology. His acquaintance with 
Peano‘s ideas in August-1900, however, led him to discard the part–whole logic and to adopt 
a kind of intensional logic instead. Among other things, the predicate logic helped Russell to 
embrace a technique of treating infinite collections with the help of a singular concept which 
he called ‗denoting phrase‘. He hoped that this step will give him the resources for a paradox-
free treating of infinity number. Unfortunately, this hope remained unfulfilled; his new con-
ception only removed the paradoxon of infinity from the realm of infinite classes (ordinal 
numbers) to that of class-inclusion (cardinal numbers). 
Russell‘s long-elaborated solution to his paradox developed between 1905 and 1908 was 
nothing but setting aside some of the ideas he adopted with his August-1900 turn: (i) With 
Theory of Descriptions, Russell reintroduced elements of reality (complexes we are acu-
mainted with) into logic. In this way he partly restored the pre-August 1900 realistic mereolo-
gy of complexes and simples. (ii) The elimination of classes with the help of the so-called 
―substitutional theory‖, and (iii) the elimination of propositions by means of the multiple rela-
tion theory of judgment completed this process. 
Russell as a Mereologist. Russell‘s short period as a Neo-Hegelian in philosophy of mathe-
matics was replaced by, what can be called, his analytic philosophy of mathematics substain-
tiated by the logic of relations. Russell made his way in direction of analysis after he read A. 
N. Whitehead‘s A Treatise on Universal Algebra in March 1898. At that time he maintained 
that mathematics starts with simple, indefinable fundamental ideas, from which its body is 
build out through simple, indefinable axioms. 
In contrast to his philosophy of mathematics, Russell‘s relational logic became predominantly 
analytical only after he read Cantor‘s Grundlagen einer allgemeinen Mannigfaltigkeitslehre at 
the beginning of July 1899. The change is documented in ‗Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of 
Mathematics‘, where Russell adopted a full-blooded mereology for the first time. Now he 
clamined that central in logic (not in ontology) is the relation of ‗logical priority‘, i.e. the rela-
tion of whole and part. 
In Russell‘s part–whole logic the logical consequence holds between both terms and proposi-
tions. So in ‗Fundamental Ideas and Axioms of Mathematics‘ it is assumed that ‗it is possible 
for simple concepts [too, i.e., not only for propositions] to imply others‘ (1899c, p. 293). At 
that point in time, central place in Russell‘s logic played, what was later called, the relation of 
―ontological dependence‖. 
The Turn.  In the first years of the new millennium, Russell gradually adopted two novelties 
in his logic that were developed in full first in the Principles of Mathematics: material impli-
cation and predicate logic (theory of denoting). 
First Symptom that the Turn was not Advantageous: the Paradoxes.  So far I have found 
that in an attempt to escape from the paradox of infinity, in The Principles of Mathematics 
Russell accepted class-concept and thing (individual) as radically opposite terms. In this he 
followed the new many-order logic of Peano (and later that of Frege), which embraced an 
opposition between class-concepts, on the one hand, and individuals and terms, on the other, 
etc. 
Unfortunately, as a by-product of this treatment, another paradox emerged—the paradox of 
classes. All this suggests, and I will examine this point in a while, that Russell‘s Peano–Frege 
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turn did not eliminate the paradox of infinity—it merely removed it from one realm into an-
other; that is, from the realm of infinite classes, to that of class-inclusion. 
This point did not remain unnoticed by commentators. According to one of them, Russell‘s 
official theory was that mathematics is free from paradoxes. Deep in mind, however, he con-
tinued to believe that mathematics is paradoxical (Garciadiego 1992, p. 152). Another scholar 
has noted that all the three paradoxes which Russell tried to resolve—(i) the paradox of infi-
nite ordinal number (discovered July 1899), (ii) the paradox of the largest cardinal number 
(discovered November 1900), and (iii) Russell‘s paradox proper (discovered May 1901)—
have one and the same structure. Apparently, ‗this structure was presented in the back of his 
mind as a kind of template that could be unconsciously applied to Cantor‘s work on infinite 
number.‘ (Moore 1995, p. 236) In what follows in this paper I shall try to describe this tem-
plate precisely. 
The Way Out—Theory of Descriptions and other Emendations. The Theory of Descrip-
tions was introduced mainly in order to repair these two confusions. As a matter of fact, Rus-
sell felt that the problems of paradoxicality can be resolved through a correct theory of de-
scriptions from the very beginning. Later he remembered that after years of abortive efforts to 
solve the paradoxes, the first success was the Theory of Descriptions. ‗This was, apparently, 
not connected with the contradictions, but in time an unsuspected connection emerged.‘ 
(1959, p. 79) 
But what exactly was the connection between the solution of the paradoxes of self-reference 
and the Theory of Descriptions? Above all, with the acceptance of the objects of acquaintance 
as a legitimate part of logic, Russell (re)introduced elements of reality—complexes we are 
aquainted with—into logic. In this way, Theory of Descriptions limited the competence of 
apophantism, and thus partly restored the realistic mereology of complexes and simples, em-
braced in 1898, but rejected in 1900. 
Russell also made two other emendations to his Peao–Fregean logic both of which were di-
rected at eliminating the splitting of logic into different orders: 
(i) Russel first eliminated classes. After 1905 he maintained that classes are only ―incom-
plete symbols‖ and so are not objects. There are no classes but propositions and prop-
ositional functions. According to the Ramified Theory of Types, there are also types of 
classes (attributes), but these are only one type of variables. In other words, there is a 
hierarchy of classes but not of objects. 
(ii) Unfortunately, two years later, in 1907, Russell discovered that propositions produce 
paradoxes of their own. (Of course they do: they are only unities.) In consequence, he 
came to maintain that there are no propositions. To be more exact, propositions were 
eliminated with the help of the multiple relation theory of judgment.  
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